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THE MISUSE OF BRAND X AND THE DETRIMENTAL
IMPACT ON UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE
TENTH CIRCUIT: REVISITING THE BASICS OF
THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
ANA ROMERO JURISSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
This note discusses the validity of three interpretations of the interaction between the unlawful presence bars and section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).1 Using the Chevron doctrine2 and two subsequent Supreme
Court cases clarifying the application of the doctrine,3 the note analyzes whether
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interpretations satisfy the elements of the Chevron test.4
Because the agency interpretations do not meet the elements of the test, the note
concludes that courts in the Tenth Circuit should follow the Tenth Circuit Court
interpretation,5 rather than the BIA and USCIS interpretation.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 19966
amended the INA7 by adding multiple grounds for removal and inadmissibility,
including the unlawful presence bars.8 The unlawful presence bars indicate that a
person is prohibited from admission to the United States for three years, ten years,
or permanently depending on how long he or she has been physically present in
the United States unlawfully.9 The statute that sets forth the unlawful presence bar
rules suggests that its purpose is to discourage undocumented immigrants from
entering without inspection or staying in the United States unlawfully.10 However,
the practical effect of the statutes has been to separate many undocumented immigrants from their families and to discourage many undocumented immigrants with
extensive familial and community ties from trying to legalize their status.11
In 1994, Congress added section 245(i) to the INA, which allowed certain people who had entered without inspection to legalize their status from within the

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2011. I would like to thank Professor Eileen
Gauna and Professor Jennifer Moore for their advice and guidance in the writing of this article and their
support throughout my time in law school. I would also like to thank the editors who worked so hard on this
and the other articles in this issue. Additionally, I thank my family because they are my support and
inspiration in everything I do.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).
2. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
4. See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (2007) (interim decision); Interoffice Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., et al. to Field Leadership (May 6, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocu
ments/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF (last visited June 22, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 Memorandum].
5. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2005).
6. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110
Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
7. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9); see also infra Part III.A.
9. Id. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)–(II); see also infra Part III.A.
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
11. See U.S. Rep. Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 361–64 (2005).
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United States by paying a fine.12 Congress subsequently extended 245(i) in 2000 in
the Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act,13 with the intention of preventing
widespread family separation due to the unlawful presence bars.14
Since the most recent extension of 245(i), there has been confusion over the
interaction between 245(i) and the unlawful presence bars. Namely, the question
was whether 245(i) applied to all, some, or none of the four categories of unlawful
presence laid out in sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)–(II) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)–(II).15
One of the most contested issues was whether section 245(i) should apply to subsection 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), called the “permanent bar.”16 This subsection made
people with multiple periods of unlawful stay, due to more than one instance of
entering without inspection, inadmissible.17 While some circuits determined that
245(i) does not apply to the permanent bar, the Tenth Circuit resolved the issue in
favor of applying 245(i) to people who would otherwise be excluded by the permanent bar.18
The BIA and USCIS disagree with the Tenth Circuit.19 In May of 2009, USCIS
issued an interoffice memorandum (2009 memorandum) instructing immigration
adjudicators to ignore the Tenth Circuit decision and to instead follow a BIA case
that determined that 245(i) did not apply to the permanent bar.20 This memorandum has created uncertainty for undocumented immigrants within the Tenth Circuit regarding whether they will be able to adjust their status.21
USCIS bases its authority to defy the Tenth Circuit on a 2005 case called National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.22 Brand X
is a continuation of the development of the test laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.23 for determining when a federal court
should defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.24 Brand X extended the application of the Chevron doctrine, calling for deference to an agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statute even if it runs contrary to a previously decided circuit court opinion on the same issue.25 However, Brand X did not change
the Chevron doctrine itself, and the core requirements for when the doctrine applies remain the same.26
This note analyzes the application of the Chevron doctrine to the interpretation
that the USCIS 2009 memorandum advances, asserting that the agency has misap-

12. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).
13. Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
14. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)–(II).
16. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).
18. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005).
19. See infra Part III.B.2–3.
20. See infra Part III.B.3.
21. Prior to the 2009 memorandum, controlling Tenth Circuit case law allowed people to adjust their
status under 245(i). See Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2005). However, after USCIS issued
the memorandum, whether that case law would continue to apply became unclear.
22. 545 U.S. 967 (2005); see infra Part III.B.3.
23. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984))
25. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
26. See infra Part II.C.
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plied Brand X and that the USCIS interpretation does not warrant Chevron deference. Contrary to USCIS’s stance, the agency did not have the authority to change
the relevant law in the Tenth Circuit regarding the application of 245(i) to
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) through the 2009 memorandum.27 In addition to analyzing the
legal reasons for not applying the 2009 memorandum’s rationale, this note also
discusses the negative policy implications associated with this interpretation and
proposes potential solutions to the problem.28
Part II of this note discusses the Chevron doctrine and its development through
subsequent case law. It examines the two-part test the U.S. Supreme Court outlined in Chevron, which asserts that courts should defer to agency interpretations
of statutes when the statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is reasonable.29 The Part next explores how United States v. Mead Corp.30 reiterated and solidified the requirement that the agency employ formal rulemaking procedures in
order for an interpretation to be afforded Chevron deference. In discussing Brand
X’s contribution to the doctrine, the Part considers how Brand X calls for Chevron
deference to an agency interpretation even when a prior circuit court opinion
adopts an alternate interpretation. Noting that Brand X constituted an expansion
of the Chevron doctrine,31 the Part also highlights that Brand X did not change the
initial tests Chevron and Mead established for when the doctrine should apply.
Part III discusses the development of the relevant immigration laws and cases
that are necessary for understanding the issues addressed in this article. Part III.A
outlines the development of the relevant immigration statutes, addressing the purposes and effects of the unlawful presence bars and 245(i). Next, subsection B
focuses on the Tenth Circuit and BIA case law that has dealt with the interaction
between the permanent bar rule and 245(i), as well as the 2009 memorandum indicating USCIS’s interpretation of the statutes.
In Part IV, the note applies the steps of the Chevron doctrine to the BIA decision and the 2009 memorandum. At each step, the note discusses how the immigration agency interpretation of how section 245(i) should apply to the permanent bar
fails to meet the requirements to warrant Chevron deference.32 The analysis section outlines the argument that (1) the 2009 memorandum lacks the necessary formality, (2) both the BIA decision and the memorandum’s interpretation are
precluded by the Tenth Circuit’s finding that there is no ambiguity, and (3) the
interpretation is unreasonable.
Part IV separately addresses the policy implications of the unlawful presence
bars and 245(i) and the impact of the immigration agencies’ interpretation. It highlights the imbalance between the high cost to families and to U.S. society and the
relatively low benefits provided by the unlawful presence bar rules and of limiting
245(i). The note concludes with suggestions for how to minimize the negative effects of the unlawful presence bars and maximize the benefits of 245(i) in ways that
benefit immigrant families and the United States.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part II.A.
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part IV.A.
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II. BACKGROUND LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CHEVRON DOCTRINE
Federal agencies are generally part of the executive branch and often have authority to take binding action.33 In 1946 President Truman signed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) into law to create uniformity of procedures among
federal agencies.34 The purposes of the APA are, in part, “to require agencies to
keep the public currently informed of their organization, procedures and rules,” to
provide mechanisms for allowing the participation of the public in rulemaking, and
to establish “uniform standards for the conduct of formal rule making . . . and
adjudicatory proceedings . . . which are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”35
The APA established a standardized notice and comment procedure for
rulemaking that requires notice of a proposed rulemaking to interested parties so
as to provide an opportunity for their participation in the decision-making process.36 Leaving room for agencies to formulate their own rules for specific adjudicative procedures, the APA also lays out a basic outline for administrative
adjudication procedures, both formal and informal, and establishes the right to
appeal a decision to a superior agency and to a federal court.37 Because agencies
have more expertise in the often complicated intricacies of the statutes and regulations they enforce, courts often view agency decisions as influential, and give deference to agency decisions under certain circumstances.38 Agency expertise is
especially relevant in highly technical or scientific subject matters, such as pollution control, and complicated permitting schemes, like the one presented in
Chevron.39
A. The Basics of the Test for the Chevron Doctrine
In 1984, Chevron set forth the basic rule and test regarding when federal courts
should defer to federal agency interpretations of statutes.40 Essentially, upon a
finding that a statute is ambiguous or silent on an issue, courts should defer to the
appropriate agency’s interpretation, as long as it is reasonable.41 Thus, the primary
error of the District of Columbia (D.C.) Court of Appeals in Chevron was that it
determined that the relevant statute was ambiguous, but imposed its own interpretation of the term “stationary source” rather than deferring to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).42
33. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “federal agency”).
34. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947cover.html (last visited
Dec. 21, 2010).
35. Id. at 9.
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006); CLARK, supra note 34, at 26.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006), 702; see also CLARK, supra note 34, at 93; TOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 291 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that the APA established a
presumption of judicial review unless another statute indicates otherwise).
38. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2000).
39. 467 U.S. 837, 848 (1984) (stating that the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act “are a lengthy,
detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major social issue”).
40. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
41. Id. at 844–45.
42. Id. at 842.

R
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The question that arose in Chevron was “whether [the] EPA’s decision to allow
States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’” was a reasonable
construction of the term “stationary source.”43 In 1977, Congress enacted the
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA), which established permitting programs regulating “‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air pollution.”44 The EPA
subsequently issued a regulation allowing states to interpret a “stationary source”
as relating to an entire plant instead of a single emitting unit.45 Under this interpretation of “statutory source,” modifications or installments of one piece of equipment in a plant will not trigger review as long as the modification does not increase
the plant’s total emissions.46
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the part of the
regulations permitting states to use the “bubble” or plant-wide definition of stationary source was contrary to the intention of the statute.47 The court acknowledged
that the statute was ambiguous regarding the precise definition of a stationary
source.48 Because the legislative history also did not explicitly clarify how the term
should be interpreted, the court looked to the purpose of the amendments, which
was, in part, to improve air quality by imposing a mandatory permitting scheme on
nonattainment states.49 The court determined that, although the bubble definition
was adequate for permitting schemes intended to maintain air quality, it was not an
appropriate definition when the goal was to improve air quality, and thus should
not be used in nonattainment areas.50
The Supreme Court reversed, and held that the court of appeals should have
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of the term “stationary source.”51 The Court
established a two-part test for determining when an agency decision merits judicial
deference and held that the EPA’s decision met both elements of the test.52
The first step of the test is to determine whether Congress has spoken directly to
the question at issue and made its intentions clear.53 If Congress has explicitly
stated its intent, then both the agency and the courts must defer to that intent;
however, if the court finds that the statute is either silent or ambiguous regarding
the meaning of the term or phrase at issue, then the court must go to the second
step.54 This is an implicit delegation of interpretive authority, in which Congress
may have been unintentionally silent or ambiguous on an issue.55
43. Id. at 840.
44. Id. at 839–40 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (2006)).
45. Id. at 840.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 842.
48. Id. at 841.
49. Id. at 841–42. “Nonattainment states” are those states that have not achieved the original emission
reduction goals set under the CAA, meaning that they needed to improve their air quality rather than simply
maintain current levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 842.
52. Id. at 842–43.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 843.
55. Id. at 844. There are two general ways that Congress may delegate interpretive authority to an
agency: express delegation and implicit delegation. Id. Express delegation occurs when Congress has intentionally left a gap in the statutory language for the agency to fill based on its own specialized expertise on that
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At step two, the court must determine whether the agency interpretation of the
contested phrase is a reasonable construction of the statute.56 If it is not, then the
court may set aside the regulations; if it is, the court must defer to that interpretation, even if it prefers a different one.57 Regardless of whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated interpretive power to an agency, the agency’s
regulations are reasonable and call for judicial deference “unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”58
A determination that a statute is ambiguous requires courts to defer to agency
decisions resolving that ambiguity.59 In Chevron, the Supreme Court determined
that Congress did not identify a specific definition of the term “stationary source”
in the 1977 CAA Amendments, leaving its intent ambiguous regarding whether or
not to use the “bubble” or a single unit definition.60 The Court relied partially on
the lower court’s determination of ambiguity and its finding that the statute “does
not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary source.’”61 The
Court determined that although the CAA did not explicitly refer to the bubble
definition, it also did not preclude a plant-wide interpretation.62 Rather, the Court
stated that it was for the EPA to balance the relevant interests.63
The Court found the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” to be reasonable.64 Because of the important balance between concerns about pollution control
and economic development and Congress’s inability to agree on which effort was
more vital to the public interest, the Court found that Congress’s silence and delegation of interpretive power to the EPA was justified.65 An agency’s resolution of
such a conflict between the two interests should prevail unless it is contrary to
what Congress would have intended.66
B. The Contribution of Mead: When an Agency Interpretation May Merit
Chevron Deference
Judicial deference to agency decisions is not unlimited, but is reserved for when
the agency has acted with a certain level of formality and procedure.67 In United

particular subject. Id. In addition, the Court has determined that delegations of interpretive authority may also
be implicit, in which a situation arises that Congress did not anticipate and/or the statute(s) do not directly
address, and the agency must exercise its specialized expertise to resolve the ambiguity. Id.
56. Id. at 843.
57. Id. 843–44; see also id. at 843 n.11 (stating that the agency’s decision need not be the only possible
interpretation or what the court would have come up with to be reasonable).
58. Id. at 844.
59. Id. at 843–44.
60. Id. at 851. The Court looked to two sections of the CAA that provide definitions of “stationary
source.” Id. at 839. One section states that a “stationary source” refers to “any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id. at 849 n.2 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i) (1983)).
Another section defines the “stationary source” as referring to “any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant,
including any major emitting facility or source of fugitive emissions of any such pollutant, as determined by
rule by the Administrator.” Id. at 851 (citing 91 Stat. 770 (now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2006)).
61. Id. at 841 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
62. Id. at 851, 865.
63. Id. at 851.
64. Id. at 845.
65. Id. at 847.
66. Id. at 845.
67. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\40-3\NMX306.txt

Summer 2010]

unknown

THE MISUSE OF BRAND X

Seq: 7

31-MAY-11

12:21

397

States v. Mead Corp., the question before the Supreme Court was whether or not
U.S. Customs Service (Customs) rulings called for judicial deference according to
the Chevron doctrine.68
Mead, an importer of three-ring binder day-planners, challenged a Customs ruling that the planners fell under the category of bound diaries, subject to a 4 percent tariff.69 Customs issued the ruling in a letter, indicating that the planners
constituted a diary because it was a calendar with room for writing about daily
events, and although it was comprised of loose leaf pages, it was bound because
the pages were contained in a three-ring binder.70
Mead brought its dispute to the Court of International Trade (CIT), which accepted Customs’ reasoning and granted summary judgment for the government.71
Mead appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the CIT decision.72 The Appeals Court disagreed with Customs’ and CIT’s
reasoning regarding the classification of the planners and held that Customs rulings merit no deference whatsoever.73
The Supreme Court agreed with the Appeals Court that such rulings do not
have the requisite formality to have the force of law and implicate Chevron deference, but remanded the case because the Court also determined that ruling letters
could be persuasive.74 The Court held that agency implementation of a statute merits Chevron deference only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”75
Adequate delegation of interpretive authority may be evidenced by the agency’s
authority to “engage in adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking, or by
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”76 The best indicator
of authority is the existence of authorization to produce regulations or when Congress has put in place some formal administrative procedure that promotes fairness
and deliberation in the rulemaking or adjudicative process.77 However, lack of this
procedure does not preclude Chevron deference.78 Whether an adjudicative agency
decision has precedential value on other agency decisions is another indicator of
authority, though not conclusive, of the appropriateness of Chevron deference by a
reviewing court.79 This preliminary inquiry into whether the agency in question has

68. Id. at 221.
69. Id. at 224. Prior to the ruling, the planners fell in the “other” category, for which there was no tariff.
Id. at 224–25.
70. Id. at 225.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 225–26.
73. Id. at 226.
74. 533 U.S. at 227. “Ruling letters” are letters issued by Customs to individual importers that “set[ ]
tariff classifications for particular imports.” Id. at 222–23.
75. Id. at 226–27.
76. Id. at 227.
77. Id. at 229–30.
78. Id. at 231.
79. See id. at 232.
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exercised the formality of procedure necessary to trigger the Chevron analysis has
sometimes been called Chevron “step zero.”80
In determining whether the ruling in Mead met Chevron step zero, and thus
warranted the application of Chevron deference, the Court considered Congress’s
delegation of authority to Customs and the characteristics of Customs rulings.81
Customs rulings are written letters indicating the official position of Customs regarding a specific transaction or situation and “may be cited as authority in the
disposition of transactions involving the same circumstances.”82 A ruling letter may
be modified or revoked by anyone except the recipient, and although it may be
cited, it is only binding in the specific situation it describes, not to third parties.83
The regulations issued under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS) warn third parties not to rely on other letters because they are subject to
change without notice.84 At the time Mead was decided, the letters were not subject to notice and comment and they could generally be modified without notice
and comment.85 Also, in addition to Customs Headquarters, all forty-six of the
port-of-entry Customs offices may issue ruling letters, each issuing 10,000–15,000
per year.86
The Court determined that the letters’ lack of broader precedential value, vast
annual issuance , and the lack of formal process, such as notice and comment, was
inconsistent with a congressional intent of legislative authority.87 Consequently, the
Court found that the ruling letters lacked the force of law and should be treated as
persuasive interpretations, similar to those in “policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines.”88
C. The Contribution of Brand X: When to Apply Chevron Deference
While Mead outlined a limitation to Chevron deference, in the 2005 case, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court extended the circumstances for when the Chevron test may apply.89
The Court held that courts must apply Chevron and defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute even when the agency’s decision contradicts a federal appellate court’s prior interpretation of the same issue.90

80. See STEPHEN MANNING ET AL., A Brand X Primer, in Immigration & Nationality Law Handbook
2009-10-441, 444 (Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n ed., 2009).
81. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
82. Id. at 223–23 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.9 (2000)); see also 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a) (2010) (stating that
the rulings issued apply only in response to the facts of a specific transaction).
83. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 223, 233 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.9). Additional indication that ruling letters
only apply to individual situations is that the CIT treats its review of the letters in the same way as it treats the
Secretary’s other rulings on precise, individualized, matters. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232–33.
84. 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c) (2010).
85. Mead, 533 U.S. at 223 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c)). After Mead, modifications to prior rulings
became subject to a notice and comment requirement. 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2006).
86. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233. Although the contested ruling letter was issued by Customs Headquarters
instead of one of the port-of-entry offices, the Court found there was no statutory distinction between them.
Id. at 233–34.
87. Id. at 231–34.
88. Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
89. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
90. Id. at 982–83.
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Brand X arose out of a dispute over whether cable companies that sell broadband internet service are providing a “telecommunications service” that should be
subject to regulations under the Communications Act of 1934.91 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Communications Act to distinguish between
“telecommunications carriers,” which are subject to regulation as common carriers, and “information service providers,” which are not.92
When private cable television providers began using broadband systems to provide high-speed internet service, Brand X and other small internet providers
wanted to use the broadband systems in the same way that they had used the
narrowband connections as common carriers.93 Brand X and other small internet
service providers argued that the cable companies provide a telecommunications
service that should be regulated under the Communications Act.94 On the other
hand, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that broadband internet service was an information service, and thus companies belonging to
the National Cable & Telecommunications Association were exempt from the regulations governing common carriers.95 Accordingly, the FCC issued a declaratory
ruling in favor of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, concluding that cable companies do not provide a telecommunications service as defined
by the Communications Act and therefore are not subject to the regulations of
common carriers.96
The case went to the Ninth Circuit by judicial lottery after several parties challenged the FCC’s decision and petitioned for judicial review.97 The Ninth Circuit
vacated and remanded the ruling, determining that the FCC’s decision was not
entitled to Chevron deference because it conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in AT&T Corp. v. Portland.98 In the absence of an alternate interpretation
issued by an agency, the Ninth Circuit in Portland held that cable modem service

91. Id. at 974. The Communications Act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
as a centralized authority for regulating all non-federal government use of radio and television broadcasting;
telecommunications including wire, cable, and satellite, interstate communications; and international communications initiated from or terminating in the United States. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
92. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975. Telecommunications carriers face mandatory regulations requiring them
to allow other carriers to connect to their networks, to charge reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates, and to
contribute to an FCC created fund designed to promote universal service. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–202,
251(a)(1), 254(d) (2006)). Meanwhile, information service providers, though they may be regulated under
other statutes, do not face the same mandatory regulations. Id. at 976 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–161 (2006)).
93. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1127 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that petitioners wanted the cable modem service to be classified as an information and cable service and that the
practical effect of this would be that cable broadband providers would have to open up their lines to competition). Broadband internet service uses either cable modem service or Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) to transmit information, which is faster than “narrowband” or “dial-up” internet connections and uses local telephone
facilities. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974–75. Small internet providers were able to use the narrowband telephone
connections to provide internet service because they were regulated as common carriers. See id. at 975 (stating
that the Communications Act regulated telecommunications carriers as common carriers, meaning that they
had to “design their systems so that other carriers can interconnect with their communications networks”).
94. Id. at 997–98.
95. Id. at 977–78.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 979; see also Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
98. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979–80; see also AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, prior to the issuance of the FCC regulation, the transmission of internet service to subscribers over
cable broadband facilities was a telecommunications service).
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qualified as a telecommunications service.99 Invoking stare decisis, the Court of
Appeals held that Portland, as an appellate decision, overrode the FCC’s declaratory ruling.100
The first issue before the Supreme Court in Brand X was whether the FCC’s
declaratory judgment, indicating that cable companies providing internet service
are information service providers rather than telecommunications service providers, merited Chevron deference.101 If so, the second question was whether that
judgment was a permissible construction of the Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act.102 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, determining that the pertinent section of the Communications Act was ambiguous as
to the definition of “telecommunications service” and that the FCC’s interpretation was reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.103 The Court held that a
prior judicial decision interpreting a statute can only trump an agency’s reasonable
interpretation if that prior judicial decision held that the statute was unambiguous
and thus left no room for the agency’s interpretation.104 Additionally, the Court
asserted that in order to fulfill Congress’s intent that the agencies interpret ambiguities, “[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to
fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”105
In determining whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, the Court
looked to other sections of the Communications Act and other trends in the field
of telecommunications, information, and internet services.106 It concluded that the
FCC’s interpretation was reasonable because of scientific and economic justifications.107 Therefore, because Portland had only interpreted the ambiguity but had
not held that there was no other reasonable interpretation, the Court held that the
FCC’s decision after Portland trumped the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the statute and was entitled to Chevron deference.108 The rationale of the Court was that it
would be contrary to congressional intent for the agency’s interpretive authority to
rest solely on whether it or the court has issued an interpretation first.109 Thus,
judicial precedent can only displace a conflicting agency interpretation when the
precedential cases have held that there is no gap or ambiguity for the agency to
fill.110
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s holding amounted to the
reversal of judicial decisions by executive officers.111 He asserted that it runs contrary to the Constitution’s separation of powers to permit an agency decision to
trump an appellate or Supreme Court decision simply because the judicial opinion
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979–80 (citing Portland, 216 F.3d at 877–80).
Id. at 980 (citing Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1130–31).
Id. at 980.
Id. at 974–75.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 982–83.
Id.
Id. at 977–1003.
See id. at 1001–1003.
See id. at 1003.
Id. at 983.
Id. at 982–83.
Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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did not make specifically clear that its interpretation was the only interpretation
rather than simply the best one.112 A better conclusion, he asserted, would be the
previous rule: when a court interprets an ambiguous statute in the absence of
agency clarification, the court’s interpretation is the law and subsequent agency
interpretations are not entitled to Chevron deference.113
The majority, however, argued that an alternative interpretation by the agency
does not constitute a reversal.114 Rather, by adopting an alternate view, the agency
is neither forced to assert that the court’s interpretation is legally wrong nor precluded from adopting the court’s interpretation in the future.115 Additionally, it is
the courts, not the agencies, that have the authority to determine whether or not
the Chevron doctrine applies at all.116 This last point becomes particularly significant in applying the Chevron doctrine to the immigration context because of the
importance of agencies in immigration law. Confusion regarding what the law is or
should be can result when the proper roles of the administrative and the federal
courts are not well defined. In the immigration context, this confusion can have a
detrimental impact on the most basic aspects of people’s lives.
III. APPLYING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE IN THE
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Congress enacted the INA in 1952 in order to codify existing immigration laws
that were scattered across various sections of the U.S. Code and common law.117
One of the original intentions of the INA and of immigration laws generally was to
control immigration in a way that would promote family unity.118 The INA grants
extensive authority to the Attorney General in the Department of Justice
(DOJ).119 The Attorney General then delegated most of the powers granted to it
under the INA to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), an agency
under the DOJ.120 The Attorney General also delegated some power to the BIA,
which is an agency that was distinct from the INS, but also within the DOJ.121 In
2002, the Homeland Security Act transferred the duties of INS to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and separated it into three agencies—USCIS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).122

112. Id. at 1017–18 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
113. Id. at 1019 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
114. Id. at 983.
115. Id.
116. See id.; see also, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) (stating that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction”).
117. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis (follow “LAWS” hyperlink; then follow “Immigration and Nationality Act” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 15, 2010).
118. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1365 (1952) reprinted at 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1680; Julie Mercer, The
Marriage Myth: Why Mixed-Status Marriages Need an Immigration Remedy, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293,
296 (2008); Lofgren, supra note 11, at 354.
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 269.
120. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 269.
121. Id.
122. See 8 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2010); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 269–70. One of the intentions of
splitting the INS was to separate services from enforcement. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 270.

R
R
R
R
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Immigration judges were part of the INS until 1983 when they and the BIA
became part of DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).123 Immigration judges and the BIA were within the DOJ and continued to be part of the
DOJ even after the enactment of the Homeland Security Act.124 The BIA was
created by, and is directly responsible to, the Attorney General.125 The BIA is an
appellate administrative court that reviews lower adjudicative decisions, such as
those by immigration judges (trial level administrative judges).126 Through precedent, the BIA also provides guidance for the application and interpretation of immigration laws and regulations for the USCIS, immigration judges, and the
public.127 Only a few of the BIA decisions qualify as precedent.128 To have precedential value, the opinion must be approved by the Attorney General and published by the EOIR.129 After exhausting administrative remedies—which include a
hearing before an immigration court and then a hearing before the BIA—a person
may appeal to the appropriate federal court.130
A. Unlawful Presence and Adjustment of Status
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),131 which created several new grounds for inadmissibility.132 Among other grounds, IIRIRA added unlawful presence as a ground for
inadmissibility that would result in a person being prohibited from entry into the
United States for three years, ten years, or permanently.133 These prohibitions are
known respectively as the three-year bar,134 the ten-year bar,135 and the permanent
bar.136 Unlawful presence occurs when a person is present in the United States
after overstaying a valid visa or after entering without being legally admitted (also
known as entering without inspection).137

123. Id. at 279, 281.
124. See id. (stating that the corps of immigration judges and the BIA became part of the EOIR under
the 1983 reorganization and that after the enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the EOIR remained part
of the DOJ).
125. Id. at 281; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2010).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 281 (stating that “noncitizens
found removable by immigration judges have a right of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals”).
127. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d).
128. Id. § 1003.1(i).
129. Id.
130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2006); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 291 (stating that final
deportation orders can be appealed to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals after exhausting administrative remedies).
131. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
132. Id. § 301(b)–(c).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)–(II) (2006).
134. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
135. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
136. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). There are two permanent bars, one for entering or attempting to enter without inspection more than once, and one for entering or attempting to enter without inspection after having
been removed pursuant to a formal removal order. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)–(II).
137. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). Because the provision took effect on April 1, 1997, accumulated unlawful
presence can only be measured from that date. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §309(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.); Carole M. Mesrobian, Unlawful Presence: What Happens When You Stay at the Party Too Long, in
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Under the three-year bar, an undocumented immigrant who was unlawfully present for a single period over 180 days but less than one year and departed voluntarily before removal proceedings are initiated against him or her is inadmissible for
three years.138 Under the ten-year bar, a person who was unlawfully present for a
single period over one year is inadmissible for ten years.139 Although a person may
be accumulating unlawful presence while in the United States, he or she does not
trigger the three- or ten-year bar until he or she leaves and then tries to re-enter
the United States.140 There are numerous exceptions to the three- and ten-year
bars, including exceptions for minors, battered women and children, asylees with
pending applications, and human trafficking victims.141 Additionally, an undocumented immigrant may seek a waiver of inadmissibility from the Attorney General
if the person is a spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident and
can prove that denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the citizen
or legal permanent resident.142
The permanent bar applies to undocumented immigrants who are unlawfully
present after they have committed previous immigration violations.143 More specifically, it applies when a person “who enters or attempts to enter the United States
without being admitted” has accumulated period(s) of unlawful presence that add
up to more than one year in the aggregate.144 It also applies to people who have
previously been ordered removed pursuant to INA section 235(b)(1) but subsequently attempt to re-enter.145 Although it is called the permanent bar, a person
may apply for admission after ten years from their last departure from the United
States with the approval of the Secretary of Homeland Security.146 There is also a
possible waiver if the person is a self-petitioner under the Violence Against Women Act.147
In 1994, Congress amended the INA to include section 245(i).148 Section 245(i)
allows people physically present in the United States who have entered without
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 517, 520
(2009).
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). If removal proceedings have commenced and the undocumented
immigrant opts for voluntary departure under 1229(c), then the three-year bar does not apply even if the
person has accumulated over 180 days to one year of unlawful presence. Mesrobian, supra note 137, at 517.
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)–(II), (a)(9)(C)(i)(II) (stating that, under this particular section,
undocumented immigrants entering or attempting to enter the United States after having accrued unlawful
presence will be barred from admission).
141. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii). Time spent unlawfully in the United States while the person was under
eighteen does not count towards unlawful presence for the purposes of this section. Id.
142. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
143. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C).
144. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)–(II).
145. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II).
146. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).
147. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(iii). The conditions for attaining a waiver as a battered spouse are narrower
under the permanent bar rule than under the three- and ten-year bar rules. Id. The Violence Against Women
Act requires a link between the battering that the person suffered and their removal, departures, or reentries
into the United States. Id. For normal family based immigration, a legal permanent resident or citizen family
member must petition on behalf of the immigrant for the person to be admitted. Id. However, if the immigrant
is a victim of domestic violence committed by a citizen or lawful permanent resident, the victim may become a
self-petitioner—a policy adopted by Congress in order to reduce the victim’s reliance on the abuser.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 299.
148. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 660.
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inspection, or who were in some other classes of people who were otherwise ineligible to adjust their immigration status, to be able to adjust their status to legal
permanent resident while still within the United States.149 The law applied to people with immigrant visa petitions or labor certification applications filed on or
before January 14, 1998.150 However, in the interest of aiding family reunification,
the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000 (LIFE Act) extended the INA
section 245(i) to include applications filed by April 30, 2001.151
The purpose of the original 1994 addition of INA section 245(i) was to streamline the immigration status adjustment process by allowing people to adjust within
the United States.152 Previously, undocumented immigrants in the United States
who wished to adjust their status to legal permanent resident had to leave the
country and apply for their visa at a State Department outside the Unites States.153
In contrast, 245(i) allowed people to pay a $650 fee instead and adjust their status
while remaining in the United States rather than incurring the expense and family
separation of traveling abroad.154 The 2000 extension was partially a response to
the harsh unlawful presence rules enacted under IIRIRA in 1996;155 if a person had
left the country to apply for a visa, their departure would have triggered one of the
unlawful presence bars.156 Under 245(i), however, people could adjust their status
without leaving and thus would not run the risk of triggering the unlawful presence
bars.157
There are several preliminary qualifications for applying for a status adjustment
under INA section 245(i). First, people who are physically present in the United
States, have entered without inspection, or fall within a class of legally admitted
immigrants that otherwise cannot adjust their status may apply to the Attorney
General to adjust their status.158 The person must be the beneficiary of an immediate relative visa petition or must have filed an application for labor certification on
or before April 30, 2001.159 Additionally, the person must have been physically
present in the United States on the day that the LIFE Act was enacted, December

149. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006); see also Mesrobian, supra note 137, at 520–22 (discussing Ninth and
Tenth Circuit cases that allowed people who had accrued unlawful presence under the first permanent bar to
adjust their status under 245(i)).
150. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 111, 111 Stat. 2458 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1255(i)); see also Lofgren,
supra note 11, at 363 (discussing the political benefits of 245(i) and how Congress voted to extend it to avert
the effects of the unlawful presence bar rules).
151. Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XV,
§ 1502, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); see Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 10 A.L.R. FED.
2D 435 (2006); see also Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363 (discussing the benefits of 245(i) and its extension until
Apr. 30, 2001).
152. See Lofgren, supra note 11, at 362–63.
153. Id. at 363.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 363.
156. Id. at 361–62.
157. Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by Non-Citizens, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 216–17 (2007); Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363–64.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(A) (2006). Eligible classes include alien crewmen, people in unauthorized
employment, people whose period of authorized presence has expired, some deportable aliens, and aliens who
have violated the terms of their immigrant visa. Id.
159. Id. § 1255(i)(1)(B).
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20, 2000, and pay a fee of $1,000.160 If the applicant meets the requirements outlined above, the Attorney General may grant the application for status adjustment
if the person is eligible for an immigrant visa, the person is admissible for legal
permanent residence, and an immigrant visa is immediately available at the time of
filing.161
B. Case Development on the Relationship Between Unlawful Presence and the
LIFE Act
Although both the unlawful presence bars and 245(i) may seem to create brightline rules on who may be barred from admission to the United States due to unlawful presence and who may apply to adjust their status from within the United
States, the interaction of the two laws has been a source of controversy. Because a
person must leave the United States to trigger the unlawful presence bars, 245(i)
acts as a way for people to avoid triggering the three- or ten-year bars, but is not
applicable to those who are already outside the United States.
The question courts and immigration adjudicators must address is whether or
not 245(i) applies to the permanent bar. Not all of the circuits have addressed the
issue, and there is a circuit split among those that have.162 Courts that have addressed the issue generally distinguish between INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(I) (the
“first permanent bar”), which applies to people who have accumulated more than
one year of unlawful presence in the aggregate due to multiple entries, and INA
section 212(a)(9)(C)(II) (the “second permanent bar”), which applies to people
who have re-entered without inspection after a prior removal order.163
1. The Tenth Circuit’s Broad Application of 245(i) in Padilla-Caldera v.
Gonzales
The Tenth Circuit held that the first permanent bar does not preclude people
from being able to adjust their status under 245(i).164 In Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether the first permanent bar
precludes the Attorney General from having discretion to adjust the status of a
person who has re-entered without inspection and accumulated over one year of
aggregate unlawful presence.165
Concepción Padilla-Caldera is a native from Mexico who came to the United
States when he was a teenager.166 He entered the country without inspection in
1996 or 1997, and soon after met Keisha Cordova, a U.S. citizen who he married in

160. Id. § 1255(i)(1)(C).
161. Id. § 1255(i)(2).
162. See Mesrobian, supra note 137, at 520 (indicating that only the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have addressed whether someone is inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)).
163. See id.
164. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit had also held
that 245(i) applies to INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). See Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 554–55 (9th Cir. 2005).
But see Diaz-Castaneda, 25 I. & N. Dec. 188 (2010) (interim decision) (rejecting the holding of Acosta v.
Gonzales and finding that those inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are therefore ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i)).
165. 453 F.3d at 1239.
166. Id.
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1999.167 Keisha filed a petition to adjust her husband’s status and attain an immigrant visa for him in 2000.168 Although INS ruled favorably on the petition, PadillaCaldera had to leave the United States and go to Mexico to apply for a green card
at the U.S. Consulate because the law at the time required that people who entered illegally apply for adjustment of status outside of the country.169
Because Padilla-Caldera had entered the United States without inspection and
had remained in the country for over a year, he was inadmissible under the tenyear bar, even though the INS had ruled favorably on his petition in the United
States.170 The consular officer advised the couple to contact the INS in Denver to
get an I-601 Waiver of Ground of Excludability, which is a waiver designed to
apply to circumstances in which a person who is a U.S. citizen can demonstrate
that denying his or her spouse permanent residency would cause extreme hardship.171 Shortly after Keisha returned to Colorado to get money for the waiver fee,
she became ill, and, on May 11, 2000, Padilla-Caldera re-entered without inspection to care for her.172 Three days later, the INS detained Padilla-Caldera and
found him removable under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).173 The INS released him
on bond shortly after and he continued to live with his wife for three more years,
during which time they had a child together.174 On June 2, 2003, Padilla-Caldera
was arrested at the ICE office.175 The immigration judge initially intended to grant
him the I-601 waiver, but the government argued that he was inadmissible under
the first permanent bar and therefore a waiver was not available until ten years
after his departure.176
Padilla-Caldera asserted that the LIFE Act should allow him to adjust his status.177 However, even though Padilla-Caldera’s wife had filed the petition before
the April 2001 deadline, the immigration judge accepted the government’s assertion that, because Padilla-Caldera was inadmissible under the first permanent bar,
he was not eligible to benefit from the LIFE Act.178 The BIA affirmed and PadillaCaldera appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.179
The Tenth Circuit Court held that the first permanent bar and section 245(i)
conflicted, but asserted that conflicting statutes may be resolved using the canons
of statutory construction.180 The canon the court employed was that courts should
interpret conflicting statutes to give best effect to both, but should also consider
subsequent amended statutes.181 Thus, because the LIFE Act was enacted in 2000
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1240.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) bars undocumented immigrants who are present in the United
States and have not been formally admitted or paroled. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The immigration judge asserted that because the LIFE Act indicates that only those who are
otherwise admissible may adjust their status, Padilla-Caldera did not qualify. Id.
179. Id. at 1240–41.
180. Id. at 1241.
181. Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984)).
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and IIRIRA was enacted in 1996, the court concluded that Congress intended that
the LIFE Act should apply to undocumented immigrants deemed inadmissible
under INA section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).182
The court also considered the legislative history and policy reasons for passing
section 245(i).183 The court indicated that the members of Congress who supported
the LIFE Act emphasized that the primary goal of the Act was to facilitate family
reunification for people who had entered illegally and/or violated their status, but
had otherwise “played by the rules.”184 Additionally, the court pointed out that
another section of the LIFE Act grants the Attorney General the authority to
“waive non-criminal grounds of inadmissibility ‘to assure family unity.’”185 Other
grounds for waiver include when it serves humanitarian purposes or when it is
otherwise in the public interest, including section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).186 Because the
overall purpose of the Act is to benefit people who have entered illegally or violated their status, but have complied with the law in every other way, the court
determined that Congress intended 245(i) to apply to people otherwise inadmissible under the first permanent bar.187
The government asserted that this conclusion was contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion in Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort.188 There, the court determined that
an undocumented immigrant who has been deemed inadmissible under the second
permanent bar could not adjust his status under the LIFE Act.189 However, the
court reasoned, under this second category of the permanent bar, a person is inadmissible if he or she has re-entered without inspection after departing under an
order of removal, rather than simply after departing and re-entering.190 The Padilla-Caldera court drew its reasoning for the distinction from another section of
the INA that requires the reinstatement of a person’s prior removal order if that
person illegally re-enters the United States.191 The court asserted that inadmissibility under the second permanent bar means that the person did not “play by the
rules” because they violated a direct court order.192 It was the unavailability of
relief for those who have violated direct orders of removal that allowed the Court
to distinguish the first permanent bar in Padilla-Caldera from the second permanent bar in Berrum-Garcia.193
The Padilla-Caldera court referred to an internal guidance memorandum issued
by the INS in 1997, which indicated that people subject to the permanent bars are

182. Id. at 1242 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981)).
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S112 63-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
185. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(B) (2006)).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(B)(most criminal and security related grounds under INA section 212 are
excluded from this rule).
187. Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1242.
188. Id. at 1243.
189. Id. (citing Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 2004)).
190. Id.
191. Id. The removal order cannot be re-opened and is not subject to review, and the person cannot
apply for any relief under the INA. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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inadmissible and ineligible to adjust their status.194 However, the court did not find
the INS’s conclusion persuasive and asserted that it did “not owe rigorous deference to such determinations.”195 Declaring that the INS had no basis for such a
determination, the court instead concluded that Congress clearly intended the
LIFE Act to apply to people like Padilla-Caldera who have accumulated unlawful
presence under the first permanent bar.196 Thus, although the immigration judge
and BIA both ruled against Padilla-Caldera and determined that the LIFE Act
should not apply to undocumented immigrants subject to the permanent bar, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the agency decision and held that Padilla-Caldera could
apply for adjustment of status under the LIFE Act.
2. The BIA’s Narrow Application of 245(i) in Briones
A year later, in Briones, the BIA came to a contrary decision, determining that
inadmissibility due to the permanent bar made a person ineligible to adjust status
under 245(i).197 Alonzo Briones, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 1992.198 While waiting for a visa to become available, Briones
remained in the United States illegally until he went back to Mexico in December
of 1998.199 After a visa became available, Briones re-entered the United States
without inspection on March 18, 1999, and filed an I-485 Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status under 245(i).200 Although the initial petition in 1993 had been approved, his I-485 application was denied in 2004 on the
basis that he was inadmissible under the first permanent bar.201 Briones argued that
inadmissibility under the first permanent bar did not preclude his status adjustment under 245(i), but the lower immigration judge disagreed and instead found
him ineligible for a status adjustment.202 Briones appealed the decision to the
BIA.203
The BIA discussed the original intent of section 245(i)’s 1994 version, finding
that it gave the Attorney General the ability to adjust the status of certain undocumented immigrants who had entered without inspection or violated their visa status and contrasted it with the intent of the post-IIRIRA extensions.204 Briones
asserted that because 245(i)(1)(A) specifically grants relief to people physically

194. Id. at 1244 (citing Memorandum from Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., INS Assoc. Comm’r, Office of Examinations, to INS Officials (May 1, 1997), reprinted in 2 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 450, 452 (June 1, 1997) [hereinafter Crocetti Memorandum]).
195. Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1244; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(stating that “[i]nterpretations such as those in letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference”).
196. Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1244.
197. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370–71 (2007) (interim decision).
198. Id. at 356.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 356–57. Between April 1, 1997, when IIRIRA went into effect, and Briones’ departure to
Mexico in December 1998, Briones had been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year.
Id. at 358. His subsequent reentry in 1999 “without admission or parole after a prior period of unlawful presence . . . of more than one year” caused him to be inadmissible under the first permanent bar. See id. at 358.
202. Id. at 356–57.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 360.
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present in the United States who entered without inspection, excluding people
subject to the unlawful presence bars for unlawful entry would frustrate the purpose of 245(i).205 Briones argued that if 245(i) did not apply to people who were
inadmissible due to unlawful presence, then 245(i) would only apply to a very narrow and rare group of people who had entered unlawfully but had been in the
United States less than 180 days.206
While the Padilla-Caldera court considered this narrow outcome as evidence
that Congress intended the LIFE Act’s extension of 245(i) to apply to the unlawful
presence bars, the immigration judge and the BIA did not.207 Instead, the BIA
determined that because the unlawful presence bars had been enacted in 1996 as
part of IIRIRA—two years after the original 245(i) in 1994—IIRIRA limited the
scope of the LIFE Act’s extension of 245(i).208
Briones also argued that INA section 212(a) provided a “savings clause” that
allowed other sections of the Act to override certain inadmissibility grounds.209
Citing a guidance memorandum that the INS issued in 1997 that directly contradicted Briones’s rationale, the BIA disagreed with Briones’s argument that the
clause meant that 245(i) applied to 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).210 The memorandum indicated that, although 245(i) would continue to apply to people otherwise inadmissible under 212(a)(6)(A)(i), it would not apply to people who had triggered the
three-year, ten-year, and permanent bars under 212(a)(9)(B) and (C).211 The BIA
accepted the memorandum’s reasoning, noting that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
rejected the reasoning put forth in the 1997 memorandum.212 It asserted that the
inclusion of 212(a)(6)(A)(i), but not 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), did not result in an absurd
consequence as Briones argued, even though the group of people it applied to may
be very narrow.213 It drew its rationale for the distinction from the fact that, while
212(a)(6)(A)(i) applies to people who have only entered without inspection or
overstayed their visas, 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) applies to a “recidivist” subset of those
undocumented immigrants who departed the Unites States after accruing unlawful
presence and then proceeded to re-enter or attempt to re-enter unlawfully.214 It
also asserted that in other sections of the INA, where Congress intended to override certain inadmissibility grounds, it used language that expressly negated the

205. Id. at 362.
206. Id. at 362–63.
207. Id. at 362. See generally Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2005) (determining
that 245(i) should apply to the unlawful presence bars in part because an alternative holding would result in
too narrow of an application of 245(i)).
208. See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 363–64.
209. Id. at 364. The beginning of INA section 212 states that “aliens who are inadmissible under the
following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006). Briones argued that the preceding clause, which stated that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act,” meant that other sections of the Act could trump the inadmissibility grounds in section
212. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 364 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)).
210. Id. (citing Crocetti Memorandum, supra note 194, at 452).
211. Id. (citing Crocetti Memorandum, supra note 194, at 452). Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA applies only to people who have entered without inspection or overstayed their visas, but have not yet triggered
the unlawful presence bars. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
212. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 365.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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applicability of the ground.215 Consequently, it determined that exclusion of such
specific language indicated that Congress did not intend 245(i) to apply to
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) violators generally.216 Based on this rationale, the BIA determined that there was no reversible error in the immigration judge’s opinion and
dismissed the appeal.217
3. The USCIS 2009 Memorandum Adopting Briones’ Rationale
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s determination in Padilla-Caldera that an internal
guidance memorandum does not merit strict deference, USCIS issued an interoffice Memorandum on May 6, 2009, stating that “inadmissibility under section
212(a)(9)(B) or (C) of the Act makes an alien ineligible for adjustment of status
under section 245 of the [INA].”218
The 2009 memorandum indicates that Chapter 30.1 of the Adjudicator’s Field
Manual (AFM) consolidated USCIS’s policies and guidance for immigration adjudicators relating to how a person may accrue unlawful presence and thus become
inadmissible.219 The 2009 memorandum reassigned Chapter 30.1 to Chapter 40.9
and modified and added guidance to what was Chapter 30.1.220 Because the new
Chapter 40.9 contains changes not formerly included in the AFM, the 2009 memorandum also rescinded four previously issued memoranda in their entirety and, in
part, two memoranda that discussed INA sections 212(a)(9)(B) and (C).221
Chapter 40.9.2(a)(8)(C) of the AFM indicates that, contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Padilla-Caldera, a person who is inadmissible pursuant to either
INA sections 212(a)(9)(B) or (C) cannot adjust his or her status under 245(i).222
The AFM demands that immigration adjudicators, including immigration judge
and BIA members, follow Briones instead of Padilla-Caldera from the Tenth Circuit or Acosta v. Gonzales from the Ninth Circuit.223 Although the memo does not
explicitly indicate that it draws its authority from Brand X, immigration agencies
have frequently cited Brand X as precedent that allows the agency to apply
Briones even when it contradicts a previous circuit court decision.224 Thus, the
question becomes whether the memo and the change to the AFM constitute a
valid use of agency authority under Brand X and Chevron. The following part applies the Chevron analysis to the interpretation USCIS put forth in the 2009 memorandum, breaking down each element of the three-part test. The part also draws

215. Id. at 367 (referring to laws enacted in 1997 and 1998 that allowed Cuban, Central American, and
Haitian undocumented immigrants who had accumulated unlawful presence or engaged in unauthorized employment to adjust their status).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 371.
218. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 4, at 20.
219. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1 (the 2009 Memorandum contains the AFM and thus subsequent citations to AFM will be cited to the appropriate page number in the 2009 Memorandum).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1–2.
222. Id. at 20.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, referral for Panel Review,
and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34654, 34660–61 (proposed June 18, 2008) (8 C.F.R.
1003.1 (g), (e)(4)–(5) (2006)).
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attention to the effect of the USCIS interpretation on the lives of hundreds of
undocumented immigrants and their families.
IV. ANALYSIS
There are many legal, policy, and social problems with the adoption of the 2009
USCIS memorandum and the AFM’s interpretation of the interaction between
245(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Regardless of the social implications for undocumented immigrants and their families, courts in the Tenth Circuit should not follow
Briones as the AFM and the 2009 memorandum assert they should, because Chevron and Brand X do not grant immigration courts the legal authority to do so. The
policy put forth in the 2009 memorandum fails at each step of the Chevron analysis. Additionally, following Briones would have a tremendous negative impact on
people and families that would otherwise have found relief under the Padilla-Caldera rule.
A. Inappropriate Application of Chevron and Brand X
1. Lack of Formality
The Brand X decision did not change the fundamental Chevron analysis. Although Brand X held that Chevron deference may apply to an agency interpretation even if there is already an on-point circuit court decision, it did not change the
requirements the agency must meet before invoking the doctrine. As indicated in
Part II, the preliminary step or “step zero” of the Chevron analysis is determining
whether the agency acted with the requisite level of formality for the action to be
considered binding law.225 Only certain agency decisions qualify as binding law.226
In Chevron, the EPA interpretation of the term “stationary source” had binding
authority because it was a formally issued regulation.227 Similarly, in Brand X the
FCC’s determination that cable companies are information services rather than
telecommunications services had binding authority because it was a published FCC
decision intended to have precedential value.228 Conversely, the court in Mead held
that United States Custom Service letter rulings did not merit Chevron deference
because they could be issued and modified without notice and comment,
thousands could be issued each year, and they had very limited precedential
value.229
In the immigration context, only certain types of decisions by particular entities,
including the BIA, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
qualify as binding decisions.230 Even among these three sources of binding authority, only certain decisions carry the force of law. For example, while published BIA
225. See supra Part II.B.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (determining that letter rulings issued by
the U.S. Customs Service were not binding law but were afforded some level of deference).
227. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2010). The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General or
their designees can approve certain BIA decisions or other decisions for publication as binding precedent. Id.
BIA and Attorney General decisions are binding on members of DHS and immigration judges, and BIA panel
members may vote to determine whether a case becomes precedent for subsequent proceedings on that same
issue or issues. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010). By approval of the Attorney General, decisions by the Secretary of
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decisions have binding precedential value, unpublished BIA decisions are neither
binding on circuit courts nor on lower immigration courts.231
In addition, regulations dealing with immigration are published primarily under
Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.232 The regulations have the force of law,
in part because they must first be subjected to the notice and comment rulemaking
procedure required under the APA.233 Various immigration agencies also issue guidance in the form of memoranda and field guidance instructions, which do not
carry the force of law because they have not been through the proper APA
procedures.234
In Mead, the court compared non-binding customs letters to policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, and found that although the letters
were persuasive, they were not binding precedent that warranted Chevron deference.235 Similarly, the 2009 interoffice memorandum and the changes to the AFM
fall directly in this category defined in Mead of agency interpretations that are
persuasive, but lack the force of law.236 The 2009 memorandum and its changes to
the AFM provide policy guidance for immigration adjudicators;237 while the guidance is persuasive authority, it is not binding on courts.238 In circuits like the
Tenth, where an appellate court has already decided the issue in a contrary way,
the AFM and 2009 memorandum guidance may simply influence a circuit court’s
decision to maintain the Padilla-Caldera standard. Thus, district courts within the
circuit are bound to adhere to their circuit court’s law, not the policy offered by the
AFM and 2009 memorandum.239 Because only published BIA decisions and formally issued agency regulations may merit Chevron deference, the 2009 memorandum and the AFM do not reach steps one or two of the Chevron analysis and thus
cannot be afforded Chevron deference.240
Not only must an interpretive decision be made by a person or entity with the
authority to issue binding decisions, but the decision-maker must have also formally acted under that authority, invoking its gap-filling or ambiguity resolving

Homeland Security may also be binding in the same way as BIA and Attorney General opinions. Id.
§ 1003.1(i).
231. See Medrano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (1991) (stating that decisions that the BIA does not designate as having precedential value are not binding on USCIS or immigration judges); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001) (indicating that an administrative decision that only binds the parties in
that specific incident and does not extend to third parties fails to carry the force of law).
232. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 275.
233. See id.
234. Id.; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000))
(suggesting that policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines do not merit Chevron
deference).
235. Id. at 234 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
236. Id. (stating that agency manuals and enforcement guidelines do not have the force of law).
237. 2009 Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1.
238. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 234 (stating that agency interpretations that do not carry the force of law
can still be persuasive).
239. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that circuit court decisions are
binding on all courts within that circuit, including the appeals court, unless overruled by the circuit court sitting
en banc or by the Supreme Court).
240. See, e.g., Mead 533 U.S. at 234 (holding that only certain agency decisions issued with sufficient
process and authority may merit Chevron deference).
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power.241 Consequently, in order to invoke Chevron and Brand X analysis, the BIA
must indicate that it is exercising its authority to interpret a statutory ambiguity by
identifying the ambiguity it seeks to resolve.242 If it asserts that it is applying the
clear meaning of the law, then it is not interpreting an ambiguity that would implicate Chevron deference.243 The Briones court based its decision on what it thought
to be a clear reading of the statute at issue.244 Because it did not identify an ambiguity that it was clarifying, the BIA failed to invoke the Chevron doctrine. This
leads into step one of the test, an analysis of whether there is an ambiguity to be
filled.
2. Lack of Ambiguity
The Brand X case did not change the Chevron analysis, but simply clarified that
the Chevron doctrine may still apply where a circuit court has already made a
ruling on an ambiguous issue in a statute.245 In order for Brand X to apply, there
must still be an ambiguity in the statute that would invoke the Chevron doctrine.246
If the circuit court has ruled on a statute’s meaning and found there to be no
ambiguity, the vertical structure of the U.S. judicial system demands that lower
courts, including administrative courts in that circuit, follow that ruling.247
As discussed in Part II.A, step one of the Chevron analysis looks to whether
Congress’s intent is clear or whether it has left an explicit or implicit gap for the
appropriate agency to fill.248 If Congress’s intent is clear, lower courts and agencies
must adhere to that intent, leaving no room for alternate agency interpretations.249
Even if there was an agency decision with the requisite formality to overcome a
circuit decision, Padilla-Caldera precludes the invocation of Brand X by finding,
through the use of statutory construction, that the way that Congress intended
245(i) to apply to the permanent bar was not ambiguous.250 Although the court
identifies a conflict between 212(a)(9)(B) and (C) and 245(i), it resolves the conflict by considering Congress’s intent in passing the LIFE Act and by implementing the canons of statutory construction.251
Caselaw interpreting and clarifying Chevron indicates that a court’s use of canons of statutory construction does not necessarily mean that a statute is ambigu-

241. See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1159, 1167 (2009) (remanding the case back to the BIA because
the BIA did not exercise its interpretive authority under Chevron in its decision).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 362–63 (2007) (interim decision); see also infra Part IV.A.2 (outlining
the Briones case).
245. See Puentes Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Brand X in no way calls
into doubt our many previous judicial interpretations that rested on the unambiguous words of the statute.
Chevron step one remains Chevron step one after Brand X”).
246. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).
247. See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that circuit court decisions are binding on all
inferior courts within that circuit, and that they can only be overruled by the circuit court sitting en banc or by
the Supreme Court).
248. See supra Part II.A.
249. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
250. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2005).
251. Id. at 1241–42; see also supra notes 178–184 and accompanying text.
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ous.252 Rather, a court may look to the purpose, history, and structure, as well as
the plain text, in determining the meaning of a statute.253 The Chevron court itself
indicates that a court may employ traditional canons of statutory construction to
arrive at a non-ambiguous conclusion. It asserts that:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.254

Thus, the possibility for Chevron deference only occurs if the court’s use of traditional tools of statutory construction fails to yield a clear intent.255
In Padilla-Caldera, the Tenth Circuit found that the traditional tools of statutory
construction provided a clear indication of Congress’s intent.256 Looking at the order in which the statutes were passed, the social context of each statute, other
related sections of the INA, and the information that was available regarding Congress’s rationale for passing each section, the court determined that Congress
meant for 245(i) to apply to undocumented immigrants who would otherwise be
inadmissible under the unlawful presence bars.257
The Briones court failed to identify an ambiguity.258 A BIA decision finding that
the statute is clear precludes deference to that decision under Chevron, and the
reviewing federal appellate court must consider the language of the statute de
novo.259 Even if the BIA asserts that a statute is ambiguous, a circuit court is not
precluded from finding that the statute is, in fact, clear.260 Since Marbury v.
Madison, it has been undisputed that Article III courts “always retain the power to
say ‘what the law is.’”261 Thus, a circuit court may determine that a statute is clear
even when the BIA has held that it was ambiguous, and an ambiguity must exist
for Chevron to be a relevant part of the analysis.262

252. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect.”); General Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (“Even for an
agency to claim all the authority possible under Chevron, deference to its statutory interpretation is called for
only when the devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (“The question whether Congress intended
the two standards [under two statutes governing asylum applications] to be identical is a pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we [the
court] have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical.”).
253. See General Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 540 U.S. at 600.
254. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
255. See General Dynamics Land Systems Inc., 540 U.S. at 600.
256. 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).
257. Id. at 1242–44.
258. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 369–70 (2007) (interim decision).
259. Manning, supra note 80, at 454.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
262. This assertion is based on the idea that federal courts can overturn agency decisions when they are
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute or unreasonable. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (asserting that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction” and, therefore, must overturn agency decisions that contradict congressional intent).
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In Briones, the BIA did not find that there was an ambiguity.263 Instead, it resolved the conflict between 212(a)(9)(C) and 245(i) by looking at congressional
intent and the history of each statute.264 It employed a similar tool of statutory
construction as did the court in Padilla-Caldera, but looked at different aspects of
the history and came to the opposite result.265 The fact that it came to an opposing
result does not indicate that the statute is ambiguous, however, because it is for the
federal courts, not an administrative court, to determine what the clear meaning of
the statute is or whether there is an ambiguity.266
3. Unreasonable Interpretation of the Statute
If there is an ambiguity for the agency to fill, step two of the Chevron analysis
looks to whether the agency’s decision is a reasonable and permissible interpretation of the statute.267 Generally, an agency interpretation is considered reasonable
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”268 As the
Padilla-Caldera court and the respondent in Briones pointed out, a determination
that 245(i) does not apply to 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) is unreasonable because it frustrates the intent of the LIFE Act.269 Therefore, the interpretation offered in the
2009 memorandum would also fail at the second step of the Chevron analysis.
Congress enacted the LIFE Act to facilitate family reunification and expedite
the immigration process for people with family members in the United States.270 In
particular, the purpose of the LIFE Act’s extension of 245(i) was to reduce the
immense negative impact of the unlawful presence bars.271 Thus, the exclusion of
people subject to the unlawful presence bars from section 245(i)’s relief would
make the act only apply to a very narrow portion of the population affected by the
bars. As the respondent in Briones argued, to exclude people subject to the unlawful presence bars from being able to adjust their status under 245(i) would mean
that only people who had entered without inspection but applied for adjustment of
status before crossing the 180-day mark would be eligible to adjust their status.272
This would reduce the number of people who are eligible to a very narrow portion
of the population and greatly reduce the effectiveness of the LIFE Act.273

263. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 369–70; see also supra Part III.B.2.
264. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 363.
265. Id. at 363–65.
266. See Puentes Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Manning, supra
note 80, at 443 (“Step one under Chevron [determining whether an ambiguity exists] plainly contemplates that
Article III courts will engage in statutory interpretation.”).
267. See supra Part II.A.
268. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
269. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the goal of the LIFE
Act to facilitate family reunification for “illegal entrants and status violators who have otherwise ‘played by the
rules’” (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S112 63-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis original)); Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 364 (2007) (interim decision) (relating that Briones argued that his inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) “arises from the precise circumstance that section 245(i) was intended to
forgive”).
270. Buckman, supra note 151, § 2.
271. Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363.
272. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 364; see also supra Part III.B.1.
273. See Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363; see also James D. Kremer et al., Severing a Lifeline: The Neglect
of Citizen Children in America’s Immigration Enforcement Policy 73 (Jan. 19, 2010) (Dorsey and Whitman
LLP to the Urban Institute 2009), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyProBono_SeveringLifeline_web.
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Although the Briones court argued that IIRIRA changed the parameters of the
original 245(i), the purpose of extending 245(i) in 2000 was in part a reaction to the
negative impact of the unlawful presence bars.274 Therefore, any interpretation of
the statute that excludes violators of the first permanent bar appears to run directly contrary to the intention of the LIFE Act.
B. Policy and Social Reasons for Not Following Briones
There has been criticism of the unlawful presence bars in general for inhibiting
family reunification without having an effective impact on discouraging immigration violations.275 Additionally, there are benefits to families and U.S. society as a
whole that will derive from applying 245(i) to the unlawful presence bars.276
The separation of families caused by the unlawful presence bars has detrimental
effects on families. Due to challenges in tracking the exact number of undocumented immigrants, it is difficult to determine precisely how much of an impact
the unlawful presence bars have had on increasing family separation since their
enactment.277 However, several studies indicate that the bars have forced many
families, including those with family members who are U.S. citizens, to make tough
choices between family unity and economic and educational advantages.278 In 2005,
an estimated 14.6 million people, including citizen relatives of undocumented immigrants, were in mixed status families.279 Recent studies estimate that of the five
million children of undocumented immigrants in the United States, three million
are U.S. citizens.280 DHS determined that more than 100,000 parents of U.S. citizen
children had been removed between 1998 and 2007.281 Consequently, the unlawful

pdf (“[T]he vast majority of undocumented immigrants entered the U.S. without inspection and remained here
for more than one year”).
274. See Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363 (“Congress voted several times to extend section 245(i), to temporarily avert the problem of the 3/10-year bar.”).
275. See, e.g., Emma O. Guzmán, The Dynamics of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Splitting-Up of American Families, 2 THE SCHOLAR 95, 104–05, 117–118 (2000)
(discussing how IIRIRA split up families and resulted in de facto deportation of citizen children); Mercer,
supra note 118, at 294, 301 (noting how the unlawful presence bars cause separation of spouses and how
section 245(i) has had a successful, though temporary, impact in mitigating the effects).
276. See infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
277. See Mercer, supra note 118, at 313; MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009 2, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2010) (estimating the numbers of undocumented immigrants in the United States and pointing out the factors that inhibit the ability to make precise calculations).
278. See, e.g., Guzmán, supra note 275, at 2 (discussing the effects of IIRIRA and 245(i) on U.S. citizen
children with undocumented parents); Lee A. Webb, A Nation that Values Family, Except When A Family
Member is Foreign: An Overview of Proposed Changes in Immigration Law and Their Devastating Effects on
Many U.S. Families, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 795, 796 (1997) (discussing the problems generally associated with increasing restrictions on admissibility and adjusting status).
279. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY 7 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). “Mixed
status families” refers to either couples in which one spouse is undocumented or families with children where
one or both parents are undocumented and at least one child is a U.S. citizen. Id. at 7.
280. KREMER, supra note 273, at 1.
281. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-09-15, REMOVALS
INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 5 (2009), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-15_Jan09.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). It is likely that the number is even higher than reported because documenting such information is voluntary, many people do not
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presence bars and other inadmissibility and removal grounds frequently result in
the separation of U.S. citizen children from their undocumented parents.282
When one or both of the parents are barred from the United States due to
unlawful presence, children face de facto deportation if they choose to leave their
country of citizenship to be with their parents, or life without their parents in the
custody of other relatives or the state.283 Parents must make the difficult decision
of what is in their child’s best interest: family unity in their home country or better
educational and economic opportunities provided by leaving their children behind
in the United States.284 Citizen spouses also face de facto deportation and must
decide if they want to give up the economic and educational benefits and comfort
of their home country to be with their spouses outside the United States.285 Many
children have never been to their parent(s)’ home country and do not speak that
country’s traditional language, which means that they face the turmoil of being
torn from a home environment regardless of whether they stay or go.286
The impact of family separation has profound negative effects on the individual
families affected, as well as on U.S. society as a whole. Children that stay in the
United States after their parents’ deportation frequently live with other family
members, and may even end up in foster homes.287 This not only results in hardship
for the children, but also increases pressure on the already stretched foster care
system.288 Additionally, even if only one parent is removed or unable to re-enter
the United States, the remaining parent “is more likely to need public assistance to
care for [his/her] children.”289 Consequently, mixed status families face negative
consequences that are borne by the family itself as well as society as a whole.
In addition, the alternative—allowing undocumented immigrants’ adjustment to
legal permanent resident status—would mean that the immigrants would have
greater labor mobility, which would increase their ability to make greater contributions to the economy in the form of increased tax revenue and wages.290 In fact,
undocumented immigrants are more likely to earn incomes below the poverty line
because of limitations on their labor mobility.291 Thus, not only would adjustment
of status benefit individual families by giving them the ability to stay together and
increase their earnings, but there are also benefits to the U.S. economy, as families
report having children for fear that their family members will get in trouble, and because the data does not
include parents who may have been apprehended at the border. Id. 6–7.
282. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GEORGIA L. REV. 65, 85–86 (2009) (discussing how the deportation of a parent puts him or her in an impossible bind
because either their child is de facto deported or the child must be left behind).
283. See Guzmán, supra note 275, at 117–18; Legomsky, supra note 282, at 85–86.
284. See, e.g., KREMER, supra note 273, at 81–84 (providing individual examples of families that have
been separated).
285. See Mercer, supra note 118, at 314–18.
286. See, e.g., KREMER, supra note 273, at 82–84 (providing examples of children who have to leave their
homes in the United States because one or both of their parents has been deported and the consequences of
their departure).
287. Id. at 118.
288. See Guzmán, supra note 275, at 118 (describing how family separation can result in children ending
up in the foster care system); Putting families first: Children are being taken into care too quickly and for too
long, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/node/5220612 (last visited Dec.
20, 2010) (discussing the shortage of case workers, budget cuts, and high numbers of children in foster care).
289. Mercer, supra note 118, at 318.
290. See id. at 314–16.
291. Id. at 315.
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are probably more likely to contribute to the economy and less likely to rely on the
government for support. Pursuing a policy that encourages legalization could also
improve wages and working conditions by undercutting the market for undocumented workers who are more vulnerable to exploitation.292
People who entered the United States without inspection face a “catch-22”
where leaving the country could trigger one of the unlawful presence bars, but
remaining in the United States increases the penalty they face for being unlawfully
present.293 Facing the choice between risking detection in the United States and
almost certainly being barred from the entry if they left or applied for adjustment,
many people choose to remain unlawfully in the United States; consequently
“[i]nstead of encouraging unauthorized foreign nationals to return home, the 3/10year bar work[s] to encourage people to stay even longer in unauthorized status.”294 Rather than discouraging people from entering unlawfully or overstaying,
the bars discourage people from leaving the United States or from seeking adjustment for fear of not being able to return.295
Section 245(i) was one attempt by Congress to take the interests of these immigrants and their families into account. Section 245(i) can provide significant benefits to families with undocumented family members as well as on the U.S.
immigration system and society in general. This is because it could allow people
who have been unlawfully present but otherwise compliant with the law to adjust
their status while still living in the United States, thus preventing the detrimental
effects of separation.296
Reports indicate that 245(i) generated significant revenue from fines it imposed
on applicants’ adjustment of status applications.297 During the first five months of
245(i)’s enactment, the INS gained $49.1 million in revenue, which comprised
eighty percent of the revenue gained from all adjustment of status applications.298
The money from adjustment fees goes into the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, which then goes toward expenses for immigration adjudication, naturalization services, administrative costs for fee collection, and providing service to those
who are exempt from the fee.299 In addition to the revenue accrued, 245(i) also
saved the State Department almost five-million dollars by reducing the workload

292. See Legomsky, supra note 282, at 101.
293. Lofgren, supra note 11, at 361.
294. Id.
295. See Lofgren, supra note 11, at 363; Michael E. Piston, Why You Don’t Dare Go Home Again—The
Insidious Impact of Unlawful Presence, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 2009-10-441, 523
(Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, 2009-2010).
296. See supra notes 283–289 and accompanying text.
297. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-162FS, INS INFORMATION ON ALIENS APPLYING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 4 (1995), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154380.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2010) [hereinafter GAO report]. This report uses data compiled by the INS and outlines
the number of people applying for legal permanent resident status under 245(i) from October 1994 through
February 1995, the revenue resulting from the applications, the denial rate, and the impact on the INS. Id. at
1–2. There are no comparable studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office on the effects of the later extensions of 245(i), so the numbers may not accurately represent current numbers, though the trends are likely
similar, based on the fact that the only changes to 245(i) when it was extended were the expiration date and
the amount of the fine.
298. Id. at 4.
299. Id. at 2; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m) (2006) (indicating the use of fee revenue should be high enough
to cover the administrative and service costs to people who are fee exempt such as asylum applicants).
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by approximately twenty-five percent.300 About forty-five percent of the people
applying for adjustment of status were applying under 245(i), suggesting that there
was a significant need for the program.301 Thus, section 245(i) and the fine it imposes provided a way to punish people for violating immigration laws and accruing
unlawful presence while still promoting family unity.
The lack of review of most immigration decisions exacerbates the problem for
people who have accrued unlawful presence under the Briones and 2009 memorandum rules.302 This is in part because of courts’ reluctance to question agency interpretations of congressional and executive action on immigration issues.303 This
reluctance largely comes from the determination early in U.S. history that Congress “possessed the complete authority to determine immigration policies” based
on the plenary power derived from Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.304 Another factor is that many undocumented immigrants lack the financial resources to
pursue an appeal.305 Furthermore, the classification of immigration violations as
civil rather than criminal means that immigrants do not have a constitutional right
to government-appointed counsel.306 Consequently, many immigrants cannot afford legal representation, especially for the multiple appeals necessary to bring an
immigration judge’s decision before a federal court.307 The BIA’s adoption of the
2009 memorandum is particularly problematic for immigrants seeking to adjust
their status, given the limited appellate court review of immigration cases. Even if
an undocumented immigrant should be able to adjust his or her status under
245(i), it is unlikely that that immigrant’s case will reach the circuit court; thus, the
immigration judge, following the rule set forth in the 2009 memorandum, may rule
against the person, but the person may not have the resources or the opportunity
to appeal to the BIA, let alone to the circuit court.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Brand X extended the Chevron doctrine to apply to agency interpretations that contradict previously determined federal appellate court cases, it did
not change Chevron to signify that any agency decision warrants deference.308
Brand X was not a revolutionary change of the Chevron doctrine and left the steps
required to invoke the doctrine untouched.309 Despite USCIS’s assertion that im-

300. LARRY M. EIG & WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-946 A, IMMIGRATION: ADPERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS UNDER SECTION 245(I) 3 (1998).
301. GAO report, supra note 297, at 2.
302. See Piston, supra note 295, at 536; Quinn H. Vandenberg, How Can the United States Rectify Its
Post-9/11 Stance on Noncitizens’ Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 616 (2004).
303. Vandenberg, supra note 302, at 608–10.
304. Id. at 609 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
305. See John P. Stern, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459,
1470 (1988) (discussing how a lack of resources to pay for an attorney and pursue appeal results in many
applicants not being represented and discouraging appeals).
306. Vandenberg, supra note 302, at 611, 614; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (providing that people in
removal proceedings or appeals of those proceedings before the Attorney General have a right to counsel, but
not to counsel paid for by the government).
307. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 292–93 (outlining the necessary process for immigrants to
exhaust their administrative remedies before they can appeal to federal circuit court); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)
(giving the laws that govern the procedure for attaining judicial review).
308. See supra Part II.C.
309. See supra Part II.C.
JUSTMENT TO
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migration adjudicators should follow Briones and disregard circuit court law with a
contrary holding, the 2009 memorandum did not have the requisite formality and
procedure to warrant such deference.310 Additionally, Brand X did not alter the
requirement that the statute has to be ambiguous in order for Chevron to apply,
and even where an agency interpretation meets the formality requirement of “step
zero,” a federal circuit court finding that a statute is unambiguous still precludes
deference to that interpretation.311 Finally, in light of the purpose of 245(i) and the
limited number of people it would apply to under the Briones decision, not using
245(i) with the permanent bar rule is an unreasonable interpretation of the interaction between 245(i) and the unlawful presence bar statutes.312
The unlawful presence bars impose harsh costs on the families of undocumented
immigrants and force families to make difficult choices between economic needs
and family unity. In the short term, a clarification of the rules of Chevron and
Brand X and how they interact with immigration agencies and the federal court
system is necessary to ensure that immigrants’ cases are decided according to correct law. Although this will not protect families in circuits where the courts have
determined that 245(i) does not apply to the 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) permanent bar, it
will protect families in the Tenth Circuit, which has held that the section does apply. The circuit split would then hopefully be resolved, in favor of applying 245(i)
to the unlawful presence bar, either by the Supreme Court or by congressional
action that would clarify the meaning of the statutes. Because the deadline to apply under 245(i)—April 30, 2001—has already passed, any clarifications in the law
will only help people who have already applied for legal permanent resident status
under 245(i) and whose cases are still pending.313
Ultimately, there needs to be a more permanent solution to the problem. Congress has voted on making 245(i) permanent, but while the Senate strongly supported it as a part of the Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, the House voted against even extending
245(i).314 For both revenue purposes, and for the purpose of facilitating family unification, 245(i) should be extended in some form and/or the unlawful presence bars
should be revoked. This type of long-term solution is necessary to best deal with
the harsh effects of the current system.
In light of the negative effects on immigrants and their families, as well as the
fact that the 2009 memorandum fails at every step of the Chevron analysis, it is
clear that USCIS’s memorandum is an inappropriate application of Brand X and
the Chevron doctrine. It is not the place of the agency to determine the scope of its
own power; rather, it is the courts’ role to determine when a statute leaves space
for agency interpretation. Consequently, immigration adjudicators in the Tenth
Circuit should follow the law as set out in Padilla-Caldera until Congress or the
Supreme Court resolve the issue, preferably in favor of a broad application of
245(i).

310. See supra Part IV.A.1.
311. See supra Part IV.A.2.
312. See supra Part IV.A.3.
313. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
314. See S. Rep. No. 105-48, at 32 (1997) (indicating that the purpose of the Act was, in part, to deal with
funding problems and other shortcomings of the immigration process); Mercer, supra note 118, at 301–302.
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